Introduction
In the theory of economic policy it has long been customary to contrast the Tinbergen principle and the Theil approach (see, for example, Shaw, 1977) . According to the former, if a policymaker has n objectives then he or she typically needs n instruments in order to be able to attain all the targets. In the monetary policy context inflation targeting, with a single instrument, the interest rate, deployed to hit a single target, for inflation, has been seen as the solution to the assignment problem (e.g. Allsopp 2010) , and the Tinbergen principle has been presented as a key argument against 'leaning against the wind', that is against the proposal for monetary policy to respond to asset prices as well as to inflation put forward by Cecchetti et al. (2000 Cecchetti et al. ( , 2002 . Under the Theil approach, on the other hand, the policymaker is accepted to have more objectives than instruments, and has to decide how to deploy his or her instruments in order to achieve the preferred trade-off between the objectives.
It can be argued that the period for which single-instrument, single-objective, inflation targeting was apparently appropriate -the Great Moderation -was in fact an unusual (and misleading) interlude, and that the norm is a state of the world in which monetary policymakers have to consider multiple objectives and are not able to forecast all major shocks (e.g. Cobham, 2012) . This suggests that it would be useful to analyse empirically the extent to which policymakers have in fact pursued multiple objectives. This is done here first by identifying what variable, if any, has been held stable within narrower margins than any other; when some variable has been stabilised in that way we regard it as the result of the de facto pursuit of a single objective of that type. When no single variable has been stabilised in this way policy is characterised as having had de facto multiple objectives: it is assumed that the policymaker always could, if they cared only about one variable (and therefore ignored the costs associated with developments in any other variables), stabilise that variable, so that if they have not done so then they must be implicitly pursuing (trading off between) multiple objectives. The economic performance under different de facto objectives, in terms of inflation and growth, can then be evaluated and it turns out that performance under multiple objectives has in many cases been satisfactory. This suggests that the pursuit of multiple objectives, for example inflation targeting together with 'leaning against the wind', should be more actively considered. Over recent decades there has been a widespread move towards increased central bank independence with the central bank having an explicit remit set in most but not all cases by its government. The paper therefore proceeds to consider how multiple objectives could best be handled within such a modern monetary policy framework which incorporates accountability and transparency as part of a strategy for controlling inflation expectations and inflation itself.
Section 1 sets out a methodology for identifying episodes of single and of multiple objectives. Section 2 reports the basic results from implementing that methodology, for what the IMF lists as 'advanced economies'. 1 Section 3 discusses those results and examines the economic performance associated with different types of objectives. Section 4 sets out how an inflation-targeting central bank's remit could be modified to allow it to pursue other objectives when appropriate within an overriding price stability constraint. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
The methodology developed here shares a focus on variations in exchange rate regimes with the classification of Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , who used statistical data to classify exchange rate regimes by individual years. It also has a focus on variations in monetary policy regimes, which are typically identified on the de jure basis of preannounced targets (for inflation or money or other aggregates). 2 The methodology developed here is different in that it brings together exchange rate and other potential monetary policy objectives in a unified comprehensive analysis. However, it does not aim to provide a characterisation of the monetary regime in each country at each point in time; for example, it does not consider pre-announced targets and it does not take into account the wider effects on expectations of different kinds of (pre-announced) monetary regimes. 3 Instead, its focus is on the single objectives, if any, which the monetary authorities have in fact successfully pursued, whether those are domestic or external, and -by elimination -on the authorities' pursuit of multiple objectives, over calendar years. Because the concern here is with realised outcomes rather than intentions (or regimes), the identity of the monetary policymaker -government or central bank -plays no role in the classification, though the secular move from policymaking by governments to policymaking by independent central banks has obviously contributed to the changes in realised objectives and realised outcomes, notably the long-term decline in inflation, over the period.
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Principles
The focus here is on the outcome rather than the intention or the means: a government or central bank which has seriously (and successfully) pursued a single objective must in some sense have controlled the relevant economic variable closely, that is within some tight limits, and must have controlled it more closely than any other such variable. On the other hand, a policymaker who declines to control any variable to that degree of precision (but may be stabilising more than one variable within looser limits) can be assumed to have decided that the costs of pursuing a single objective in terms of the effects on other possible objective variables is too high, that is, the policymaker is implicitly pursuing multiple objectives. To assess this what is needed is an approach which allows us to compare the degree of control across different variables, which means that we need a common way of measuring performance in terms of the different variables. The principal alternative variables that policymakers might have tried to stabilise over the period concerned are the growth rates of prices, real income, nominal income and money, 5 on the one hand, and exchange rates, on the other hand. Fixed exchange rates can be represented by zero growth rates of exchange rates, while crawling pegs would involve non-zero growth rates. 6 The outturn for these variables can therefore be compared in terms of the standard deviation of the growth rates of each of these variables. Pursuit of a single objective will be identified by (a) the relevant standard deviation being below those for the other possible objective variables and (b) the relevant standard deviation being below some absolute threshold. On the other hand, if these criteria are not fulfilled for any single objective, it is assumed that the monetary policymakers are implicitly trading off between more than one objective, that is, pursuing multiple objectives.
The genuine pursuit of a single objective must be the result of the deliberate use for that purpose of the policy instrument(s), rather than the workings of chance. In investigations of de facto regimes Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) have ensured this by examining data on the use of the policy instruments (foreign exchange reserves, also interest rates). Complications could arise if this was done here from, for example, the stability of policy interest rates at the effective lower bound after 2009, or indeed at other important turning points, particularly given the focus on individual calendar years. Hence, given that the emphasis is on the outcome rather than the means, the variability of possible instruments will be ignored but the criteria for identifying the objectives followed will be drawn sufficiently tightly to make chance attainment of an objective highly unlikely. The idea behind the relative criteria is that if the policymaker is seriously pursuing a single objective, he or she must be stabilising its growth more than that of any of the other variables.
The effect of the threshold criteria for SP, SY and SPY is that (under a normal distribution) the growth rate of the variable must in 68% of cases be no more than 0.5 away from the mean (e.g. in 68% of cases inflation must be no more than 0.5% away from its mean), and it must in 95% of cases be no more than 1 away from the mean; this is, if anything, a little less strict than the rules typically involved in formal inflation targeting. 9 The corresponding threshold criterion for monetary growth is set at 1, on the grounds that monetary growth is inherently less stable (or inertial) in the short run than the growth of prices or income; even so, as will be shown below, relatively few cases of SM are identified.
On these criteria it turns out that in many country/year cases policymakers have not been pursuing single objectives, from which it is inferred that de facto they have been following a number of different objectives, but these cases vary widely in terms of policy operation and performance. Given the primacy typically accorded in theoretical and policy analysis to price stability, the following simple distinction would seem to be appropriate:
type of objective criteria multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint MC no single objective threshold criteria fulfilled but average inflation < 5% multiple objectives (unconstrained) MU no single objective threshold criteria fulfilled, and average inflation ≥ 5%
On the external side, data on exchange rates of currencies against the US dollar, the Deutsche mark (DM) up to the end of 1998, the ecu (data are available from 1979 Q3 to 1998 Q4) and the euro (from 1999) are used to generate four quarter growth rates, from which the standard deviations over the six quarters are calculated. where gusd, gdm, gecu, geuro and ggbp represent respectively the growth rates of exchange rates against the dollar, the mark, the ecu, the euro and the UK pound. The final row relates only to Ireland, which was in a currency union with the UK up to mid-1979, so that its σ ggbp was equal to 0.
The relative criteria here ensure that a government or central bank has stabilised its exchange rate on one anchor currency more closely than on any other. The threshold criteria require that 68% of the time the exchange rate growth must be no more than 1 percentage point away from its mean, and 95% of the time it must be no more than 2 away from the mean. This is less strict than the threshold criteria used for the domestic objectives other than money, but exchange rates are inherently more volatile than most of the domestic variables, and these criteria are comparable to the exchange rate bands used in the Bretton Woods system from late 1971 and in (the narrow band of) the European Exchange Rate Mechanism from 1979 to 1993 (2.25% in either direction). 11 The criteria here do not include policy interest rates (which are typically more stable than exchange rates) or foreign exchange reserves, as discussed above. However, the thresholds are sufficiently strict that they identify, as will be shown below, rather few cases of de facto exchange rate objectives in the sample, which suggests that the method is unlikely to be picking up spurious examples of chance exchange rate stability. Cases where no de facto exchange rate objective is being pursued are labelled as follows:
type of objective criteria no exchange rate objective NER no single exchange rate objective threshold criterion fulfilled
The final step is to choose between domestic and external objectives where both have been identified for a particular country/year. This is done by comparing the standard deviation of the domestic and external objectives identified for each country/year to find the lower (and for this purpose the standard deviation of inflation is used for MC as well as for SP). The algorithm also ensures that a country/year case where there is a domestic objective of some kind but no external objective is classified in terms of the domestic objective, while a case where there is MU in terms of the domestic objective but a clear exchange rate objective is classified in terms of the latter. The overall default category is MU, no clear domestic or external objective and average inflation ≥ 5%. larger numbers in the shorter second and third subperiods, for countries widely thought to be informal or formal inflation targeters, e.g. Germany, Switzerland, the US, Sweden, the UK, and the euro area. There is a small reduction in SP cases between the second and third subperiods due to the consolidation of the euro area countries in one policymaker, and then a sharp fall in the crisis subperiod. The two multiple objective strategies cover a large number of cases, with the relative incidence of MU declining through the subperiods and that of MC rising, which reflects a general rise in the priority accorded to price stability and a general decline in inflation over time. Table 2 shows the numbers of different exchange rate objectives identified over the same subperiods. Here the cases where no objective is feasible are shown by Z, which includes the cases of anchor countries such as Germany pre-1999 and the US as well as the X cases covered in Table 1 . The first point to note here is that, on the criteria used and for the sample of advanced countries included, there are relatively few cases of single exchange rate objectives. The largest number is for the Deutsche mark in the decade or so before European
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Monetary Union (when in addition some countries sometimes pegged more closely to the ecu than to the mark), while there are a few for the dollar in the earlier subperiods (e.g. Korea in some years) and rather more for the euro from 1999 (e.g. Denmark, and countries moving towards joining EMU). In each subperiod a large majority of cases are NER, no clear exchange rate objective.
[ Table 2 near here] Table 3 shows the strategies as finally identified, when the domestic and external objectives have been brought together and appropriate selections made. The effect of the consolidation is that some of the exchange rate objective cases have dropped out (that is, been replaced by a domestic objective), notably for pegs to the DM and the ecu in the run-up to EMU, and for pegs to the euro from 1999, while the occasional domestic objective has been replaced by an exchange rate objective (e.g. Netherlands 1987 goes from SY to SDM). At the same time the number of MU cases has gone down a little, mainly in the first subperiod, as countries with no clear domestic objective turned out to have clear external objectives, and there is a slightly larger decline for MC, particularly in the first subperiod.
[ Table 3 near here]
Overall, the table is dominated by SP, MC and MU, with the incidence of SP (the percentage relative to the identified totals) increasing in the second and third subperiods but then falling back, while the incidence of MC increases in importance in each subperiod and that of MU decreases from the first to the third. More precisely, the trends in SP suggest strongly that SP is at least in large part a phenomenon of the Great Moderation, that is the second and third subperiods. On the other hand, the numbers of cases of MU and MC together as a percentage of the total cases (excluding the Xs) for the four subperiods are 61.9, 41.0, 46.1 and 63.8
respectively. These findings, that in two of the four subperiods at least 60%, and in the other two at least 40%, of advanced economy policymakers have been pursuing multiple objectives of some kind, and that a number of countries switched from SP to MC when the crisis struck, should be regarded, not as a failure of policymakers to understand the Tinbergen principle, but as a reflection of the plurality of objectives which policymakers inevitably face in a world where more than one dimension of economic activity is of concern to their citizens, and a reflection of the fact that inflation targeting has always been practised in a 'flexible' rather than 'strict' way (see, for example, Roger, 2010, p. 36). The shift over time from MU to MC could be understood as evidence of policymakers' improving ability over time to make desirable trade-offs between price stability and other objectives.
An alternative perspective on the time trends is given by Figure 1a , which shows the number of countries identified as pursuing each type of objective in each year and Figure 1b Third, they show that the SP category was well-frequented in the Great Moderation years (second and third subperiod), but at the point of the crisis many countries abandoned SP, though some came back to it in the later years. Finally, the figures make clear that while SM had its adherents at various times they were never that many, and the followers of SPY and SY were even fewer. As already indicated, these central banks' shifts of attention from inflation to other objectives in the immediate crisis years can be regarded as sensible responses to the exceptional weakness of real economic activity at this point. rather better later, again on a small number of cases. Performance under MU improved between the first and second and between the second and third subperiods, but at 7.3% in the third and 7.6% in the fourth it remained clearly unsatisfactory. Performance under MC, on the other hand, was only 2.8% in the first subperiod, the lowest for any objective, the same and a little less than under SP in the second, but slightly more than under SP in the third and in the final, crisis, period.
Performance under different de facto objectives
[ Table 4 near here] Table 5 presents comparable data for the real growth performance under each objective.
Overall, there is much less variation here, as might be expected, except for the much lower rate in the fourth subperiod. Performance under the exchange rate objectives is mixed. As between MU and MC, growth under MC is higher or the same in all except the second subperiod; it is also higher than under SP in the first and third but rather lower in the fourth subperiod.
[ Table 5 near here]
Overall, on these two measures of unconditional performance together, it is clear that MC does roughly as well as SP, while SP and MC both do a great deal better than MU on inflation, though not, except in the crisis period, on growth. These are the findings of an unconditional analysis, that is, they do not control for variables such as openness (which might affect inflation) or the investment to GDP ratio (which might affect growth). Tables 6 and 7 present the results of conditional analyses, where inflation and growth performance are regressed on the various objectives together with a range of more or less standard control variables. 16 The interest is in the coefficients on the objective types, rather than trying to provide a complete explanation of inflation or growth. almost always insignificant. Consistent data on fiscal deficits are available, in the form of the general government financial balance as % of GDP, only for the latter part of the period, but they are used as additional variables for the last two subperiods.
[ Table 6 near here]
Regression 1 is a pooled OLS regression for the whole period. Six of the objective coefficients are significantly negative at the 1% or 5% level, which indicates that these objectives are typically associated with lower inflation than that under unconstrained multiple objectives. These six include two single exchange rate objectives -SECU and SDM in descending order of the (absolute) for the third and fourth subperiods together, both MC and SP are significant at the 5% level, with the MC coefficient slightly higher than that on SP; this pattern remains when the general government financial balance is added in regression 8.
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[ First, the central bank's remit should continue to accord priority to price stability, but it should allow the central bank to respond to other issues including, for example, house price bubbles, exchange rate misalignments (though this is clearly more problematic) and exceptional weaknesses in real economic activity, if the policymakers see fit to do so.
Secondly, however, the remit should require such responses to be publicly announced. Here, it would be useful to adapt one of the provisions of the BoE's current remit. That remit requires the Governor, in the event of a deviation of the inflation rate from the formal target by more than one percentage point in either direction, to write an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of finance) saying why he/she thinks this has happened, what the Monetary Policy Committee is doing about it, and how long it thinks the deviation will last.
A revised remit could specify a primary and long-term target for inflation, from which the central bank can deviate in case of significant real economy weakness or threats to financial stability which it cannot be sure that it can control by using the new macro-prudential tools being introduced; but if it does so the Governor must write an open letter to the Minister of Finance specifying what the central bank is doing and why, how long it expects to be giving priority to the non-inflation objective, and how it foresees a return to normal operations. Such an arrangement would allow the central bank to take a wider view of its responsibilities but in a context of transparency and accountability which would avoid danger to its anti-inflationary credibility, on the one hand, and prevent 'political' or otherwise inappropriate policy decisions, on the other. Crucially, from the point of the 'monetary policy and asset prices' debate, this remit would convey to the financial markets and the private sector that the central bank will ultimately use interest rates to limit asset price bubbles if no other instruments are available and successful, and this should provide a ceiling to house price inflation expectations of the kind that did not exist in the mid-2000s.
Concluding comments
This paper has introduced a methodology to identify when policymakers (governments or central banks) have genuinely pursued single objectives of different kinds, that is, when policymakers have succeeded in stabilising a single variable within narrow margins. When policymakers are not stabilising any single variable to that degree, although they may be stabilising several variables to a lesser extent, they are treated as pursuing, that is trading off between, more than one objective. This methodology produces plausible individual country identifications and overall trends. It suggests that the pursuit of multiple objectives has been common in 'advanced' countries. However, the multiple objectives category covers a multitude of sins, so that it is appropriate to make a simple division between multiple objectives pure and simple, MU, and multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint,
MC.
Conditional and unconditional analysis of the inflation and growth performance associated with different de facto objectives revealed that MC -defined in a relatively generous way as inflation < 5% -is associated with inflation and growth at very comparable levels to SP (single objective of inflation), which suggests that giving up the single-minded pursuit of inflation in favour of wider objectives does not have to involve a serious cost in economic performance.
Finally, the paper has presented a proposed adjustment to the remit of a formally inflationtargeting central bank which would allow the benefits of inflation targeting to be preserved, but enable the central bank to respond when appropriate to exceptional weakness in economic activity or to otherwise uncontrollable asset price movements.
Notes
1 Estonia and Hong Kong have been excluded, the former on the grounds that it has come into the IMF's 'advanced' category only since it adopted the euro, and probably for that reason; the latter on the grounds that it is a different sort of economy subject to a variety of unusual constraints (and operating a currency board against the USD since 1983).
2 It is such preannounced targets that underlie the classification behind Slovenia pre-1993) or no separate strategy was feasible (e.g. euro area countries from 1999) or the country concerned was itself an anchor (US, Germany pre-1999, ECB from 1999). 1974-2012 1974-2012 1974-91 1992-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2012 1999- Notes: robust standard errors (clustered on country) in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; R-squared is adjusted for OLS, within for fixed effects. 1974-2012 1974-2012 1974-91 1992-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2012 1999- 
